Trust and financial trades

Radu Vranceanu (1) , Angela Sutan (2) , Delphine Dubart (1)

1 ESSEC Business School
2 BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)

In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-building.

L'article propose une étude expérimentale d'une variante originale du jeu de l'investissement. On introduit une probabilité objective de disparition du lien entre investisseur et récepteur. Le dernier pourra prétexter cet événement objectif pour jouer sa stratégie égoïste, ce que nous appelons "se cacher derrière les probabilités". Ce phénomène pourrait bien caractériser les échanges financiers.

Mots clés: Experimental Economics; Financial Transactions; Investment Game; Objective Risk; Trust

Mots clés: Confiance; Économie expérimentale; Finance; Jeu de l'investissement; Risque objectif

Domaines: Economies et finances

Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan, Delphine Dubart. Trust and financial trades: Lessons from an investment game where reciprocators can hide behind probabilities. 2010, 16 p. ⟨hal-00572384v1⟩