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Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

Abstract : We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms,
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03330587
Contributor : Jerome Pouyet Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, September 1, 2021 - 9:56:18 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 9:11:41 AM

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Johan Hombert, Jérôme Pouyet, Nicolas Schutz. Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves. Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley, 2020, 67 (3-4), pp.484-514. ⟨10.1111/joie.12204⟩. ⟨hal-03330587⟩

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