Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device

(1) , (2, 3) , (2, 3)
1
2
3

Abstract

In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
WP 2103_Vranceanu et Lamiraud.pdf (648.34 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03265817 , version 1 (21-06-2021)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03265817 , version 1

Cite

Damien Besancenot, Karine Lamiraud, Radu Vranceanu. Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device. 2021. ⟨hal-03265817⟩
201 View
93 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More