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Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device

Abstract : In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03265817
Contributor : Régine Belliard Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, June 21, 2021 - 11:45:56 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, April 7, 2022 - 1:58:19 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, September 22, 2021 - 6:26:59 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03265817, version 1

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Damien Besancenot, Karine Lamiraud, Radu Vranceanu. Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device. 2021. ⟨hal-03265817⟩

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