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Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection

Abstract : I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 15, 2019 - 6:38:18 PM
Last modification on : Monday, December 13, 2021 - 11:46:36 AM

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Anastasios Dosis. Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection. 2019. ⟨hal-02130458⟩

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