Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection

Abstract : I study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [8 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02130458
Contributor : Michel Demoura <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 15, 2019 - 6:38:18 PM
Last modification on : Friday, May 24, 2019 - 4:23:25 PM

File

WP_1906_DOSIS.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02130458, version 1

Collections

Citation

Anastasios Dosis. Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection. 2019. ⟨hal-02130458⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

10

Files downloads

99