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An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services
Abstract : The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.
Cited literature [16 references]
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01574648
Contributor : Régine Belliard Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, August 16, 2017 - 8:59:32 AM
Last modification on : Friday, January 7, 2022 - 3:52:53 AM
Contributor : Régine Belliard Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, August 16, 2017 - 8:59:32 AM
Last modification on : Friday, January 7, 2022 - 3:52:53 AM
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WP1709.pdf
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