An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services

Abstract : The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians’ decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.
Type de document :
Pré-publication, Document de travail
WP 1709. ESSEC Working paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC / Centre de recherche de l’ESSEC. ISSN : 1291-9616. 2017
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Contributeur : Michel Demoura <>
Soumis le : mercredi 16 août 2017 - 08:59:32
Dernière modification le : mardi 26 juin 2018 - 15:51:39

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  • HAL Id : hal-01574648, version 1

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Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services. WP 1709. ESSEC Working paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC / Centre de recherche de l’ESSEC. ISSN : 1291-9616. 2017. 〈hal-01574648〉

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