Harmful transparency in teams

Abstract : In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that peer transparency can be strictly harmful. This contrasts with Mohnen et al.'s result that transparency, through the observability of interim efforts, induces more effort and is thus beneficial if team members are inequity-averse. If, instead, preferences are standard utilitarian, the marginal benefit is decreasing and marginal cost is increasing in a player's own effort, then players' collective and individual efforts are strictly less with transparency than under non-transparency.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [8 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01282735
Contributor : Michel Demoura <>
Submitted on : Friday, March 4, 2016 - 12:00:39 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, May 3, 2018 - 3:18:04 PM
Long-term archiving on : Sunday, June 5, 2016 - 10:32:50 AM

File

WP 1603.pdf
Publisher files allowed on an open archive

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01282735, version 1

Collections

Citation

Kanti Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito. Harmful transparency in teams. 2016. ⟨hal-01282735⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

157

Files downloads

836