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Harmful transparency in teams

Abstract : In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that peer transparency can be strictly harmful. This contrasts with Mohnen et al.'s result that transparency, through the observability of interim efforts, induces more effort and is thus beneficial if team members are inequity-averse. If, instead, preferences are standard utilitarian, the marginal benefit is decreasing and marginal cost is increasing in a player's own effort, then players' collective and individual efforts are strictly less with transparency than under non-transparency.
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Submitted on : Friday, March 4, 2016 - 12:00:39 PM
Last modification on : Monday, December 13, 2021 - 11:46:36 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, June 5, 2016 - 10:32:50 AM


WP 1603.pdf
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  • HAL Id : hal-01282735, version 1


Kanti Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito. Harmful transparency in teams. 2016. ⟨hal-01282735⟩



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