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is your guess of S. This expression means that you will win the most (20 ECUS) if the guess is equal to the actual amount. -What is the amount you want to take from Agent A ? Fill in this box, ECUs Agent B has taken the amount T = ::: You thus will, vol.143, p.543, 2017. ,
, This ?ne will reduce the amount available for Agent B and will cost you 0.2 ECU per each ECU charged
, You are Agent A You received Y = ::: Agent B took T = ::: Your guess of T was E = ::: You required a ?ne S = ::: Your ?nal gain for this round is
, You are Agent B Agent A received Y = ::: You took T = ::: Your guess of S was Z = ::: The ?ne you received was S = ::: Your ?nal gain for this round is
, 1 5 The message box is not available in treatments T1, T2 and T5. Instructions for treatment T4
, At the beginning of each round the computer draws an integer Y in the interval [50; 100]: 2nd step. Agent B learns this amount and can take an amount T in the interval [0; Y ]: He knows that the di¤erence will go to Agent A. 3rd step. Agent A is informed about Y and about T . He thus receives the di¤erence (Y T ): 4th step. Agent A can impose a ?ne S on agent B. The ?ne can vary between
,
S is chosen by Agent A. The payo¤ of Agent B is (T S); where S is the sanction decided by Agent A. Slide 3 ,
, The Computer drew in the interval
, You can take an amount T in the interval [0; Y ]; after having answered to an intermediary question
, The ?ne will reduce you own payo¤. Each 1 ECU of ?ne will cost 0.2 ECU to Agent A. -What is your guess about the sanction S that Agent A will impose on you?, Agent A will be informed about Y and T: He will be able