"Facta non verba" : an experiment on pledging and giving

Gilles G. Grolleau (1, 2, 3) , Guillermo Mateu (2) , Angela Sutan (2, 1) , Radu Vranceanu (4)

1 LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
2 BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
3 Unité MIAJ - INRA - Mathématiques et Informatique Appliquées
4 ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184)

This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.

Mots clés: Charity giving; Pledge; Commitment; Communication; Experiments

Domaines: Gestion et management

Gilles G. Grolleau, Guillermo Mateu, Angela Sutan, Radu Vranceanu. "Facta non verba" : an experiment on pledging and giving. 2015. ⟨hal-02799567v2⟩