Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Fear of novelty : a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty

Abstract : This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientifi…c potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientifi…c value of new ideas.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [25 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Régine Belliard Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, February 18, 2015 - 11:04:03 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 14, 2021 - 3:55:54 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, April 16, 2017 - 9:46:07 AM


Publisher files allowed on an open archive


  • HAL Id : hal-01117929, version 1


Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. Fear of novelty : a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty. 2014. ⟨hal-01117929⟩



Record views


Files downloads