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Fear of novelty : a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientifi…c potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars’ ability to properly assess the scientifi…c value of new ideas.
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Dates and versions

hal-01117929 , version 1 (18-02-2015)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01117929 , version 1

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Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. Fear of novelty : a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty. 2014. ⟨hal-01117929⟩
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