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Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity ?

Abstract : This paper analyzes whether false information, rumors and other uninformative messages can cause illiquidity. In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive an uninformative but emotion loaded message. If investors believe that the message has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We solve the model for the critical message separating the success / fail states of the project. It turns out that lesser investors will participate to the collective project when they receive a negative message as compared to the case when they receive a positive message. Predictions of the theoretical model are corroborated by data provided by an Online and a Lab experiment. Insights apply to contagion and market manipulation episodes.
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https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00841167
Contributor : Michel Demoura <>
Submitted on : Thursday, July 4, 2013 - 9:01:49 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 11, 2020 - 2:07:33 PM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Wednesday, April 5, 2017 - 7:04:03 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00841167, version 1

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Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Delphine Dubart. Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity ?. 2013, pp.23. ⟨hal-00841167v1⟩

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