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The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information

Abstract : Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy within a variant of the ultimatum game. The first player gets an endowment, and the second player can impose a tax on it. The former can reject the allocation submitted by the tax-setter. A third party is then allowed to levy its own tax, and its intake is private information to the tax-setter. In a frameless experiment, 65% of the subjects in the tax-setter role overstate the tax levied by the third party in order to manipulate taxpayer's expectations and submit less advantageous offers; on average, for every additional currency unit of lie, measured by the gap between the claimed and the actual tax, they would reduce their offer by 0.43 currency units.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00690409
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Submitted on : Monday, April 23, 2012 - 2:27:03 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, August 26, 2020 - 2:46:11 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, December 15, 2016 - 12:06:59 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00690409, version 1

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Damien Besancenot, Delphine Dubart, Radu Vranceanu. The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information. 2012. ⟨hal-00690409⟩

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