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Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk

Abstract : This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.
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Contributor : Anne Crepin <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 11, 2011 - 3:51:06 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 11, 2020 - 2:07:32 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, December 4, 2016 - 2:55:08 PM


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  • HAL Id : hal-00607867, version 1


Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk. 2011, pp.27. ⟨hal-00607867v1⟩



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