A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market

Radu Vranceanu (1) , Damien Besancenot (2) , Kim Huyn (3)

1 ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184)
2 CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord
3 LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne

This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals’editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.

Mots clés: Academic journals; Desk-rejection; Publishing; Matching; Imperfect information

Domaines: Economies et finances

Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Kim Huyn. A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market. 2011. ⟨hal-00592134⟩