A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market

Abstract : This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals’editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 11, 2011 - 1:33:20 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-00592134, version 1

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Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Kim Huyn. A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market. 2011. ⟨hal-00592134⟩

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