Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device

Radu Vranceanu (1) , Claire Naiditch (1)

1 ESSEC Business School

Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount.

L'article étudie les transferts des migrants en tant que moyen pour signaler leur situation économique aux yeux des résidents. En information imparfaite, les migrants pauvres peuvent transférer plus que normal, pour se faire passer pour des migrants ayant réussi. Les migrants riches peuvent adopter des stratégies de signalisation plus agressives encore.

Mots clés: Imperfect Information; Poverty; Remittances; Signaling

Mots clés: Information imparfaite; Pauvreté; Signal; Transferts des migrants

Domaines: Gestion et management

Radu Vranceanu, Claire Naiditch. Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device. 2009, 26 p. ⟨hal-00551869⟩