Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model - ESSEC Working Papers Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model

Résumé

Crowdfunding platforms are providing funds to an increasing number of projects, among which many have a strong social/community impact. Under a all-or-nothing program, the success of the investment depends on the ability of a crowd of potential investors to put their funds into the project without an explicit coordination device. With heterogeneous information, such a problem can be analyzed as a typical global game. We assume that signals of at least some agents present a systematic positive bias, driven by positive emotions about projects with high social/community impact. The analysis reveals that if the number of such overenthusiastic persons is large enough, crowdfunding finance might support financially inefficient projects. We then analyze how a monopolistic platform optimally determines transaction fees and unveil the relationship between overenthusiasm and the profit of the platform.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
WP1802.pdf (531.79 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-01718793 , version 1 (27-02-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01718793 , version 1

Citer

Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu. Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model. 2018. ⟨hal-01718793⟩
162 Consultations
540 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More