A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market

Radu Vranceanu (1) , Damien Besancenot (2) , Kim Van Huynh (3)

1 ESSEC Business School
2 CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation)
3 LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne

Given the myriad of journal titles in economics and business administration, scholars can sometimes target the wrong journal. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture this type of informational friction. The key modelling device is a paper-tojournal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies. The model is then solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.

L'article propose un modèle d'appariement pour étudier le fonctionnement du marché des publications académiques. Il permet d'analyse le phénomène de "desk-rejection" et propose une explication pour la montée en puissance de droits de soumission d'articles.

Mots clés: Academic Journals; Editors; Imperfect Information; Matching

Mots clés: Appariement; Editeurs; Information imparfaite; Revues académiques

Domaines: Gestion et management

Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot, Kim Van Huynh. A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market. 2010, 19 p. ⟨hal-00554710⟩